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JURISDICTION
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), the Utah Court of Appeals has
appellate jurisdiction in this matter. The Order appealed from is a final judgment
which disposed of this case.
Appellant John E. Worthen ("Mr, Worthen") appeals the decision of the
Honorable Homer R. Wilkinson dismissing Mr. Worthen's claims against Appellees
Robert W. Walter ("Mr. Walter") and Berliner, Zisser, Walter & Gallegos (the '-Firm")
with prejudice.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Mr. Worthen included in his statement of the issues presented on appeal
issues that were not addressed by the trial court and were raised for the first time on
appeal. The longstanding rule is that appellate courts will not consider issues raised
for the first time on appeal. Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996)
("Issues not raised at trial cannot be argued for the first time on appeal. This rule
applies to all claims, including constitutional questions, unless the petitioner
demonstrates that 'plain error' occurred or 'exceptional circumstances' exist. . . .")
(quoting State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994))).
Mr. Worthen failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 24(5) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure considering his statement of the issues presented for
review failed to include a "citation to the record showing that the issue was
preserved in the trial court" or "a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue
not preserved in the tna court." U.R.A.P. 24(5)(A) &(B) (1999). As a result, Mr.
Worthen neither demonstrated that plain error occurred, nor that exceptional
circumstances exist that warrant this Court to review issues raised for the first time
on appeal.
Mr. Worthen's opening brief raises the following issues for the first time on
appeal:
Did the trial court err by failing to recognize that Appellant's claim did
not arise until March 23, 1995?
Did the trial court err by failing to recognize that Appellee's letter
acknowledg ng the validity of Appellant's claim renewed the statute of
limitations?
Did the trial court err by failing to recognize that the statute of limitations
was tolled by the discovery rule?
Did the trial court err by failing to recognize that the appropriate
limitations period was the six-year statute of limitations period
governing written contracts?
Did the trial court err by not recognizing that upon proving the
allegations made in the Appellant's amended complaint, Appellant
would be entitled to restitution damages?
Did the trial court err by not recognizing that upon proving the
allegations made in Appellant's amended complaint, Appellant would
be entitled to nominal damages?
Was Appellant denied adequate notice that the Appellee's motion to
dismiss was going to be decided without oral argument since the
motion was decided without a notice to submit for decision being filed
as to that motion and the Appellee's earlier request for oral argument
had not been withdrawn or otherwise waived by either party?
Consequently, Appellees Robert W. Walter ("Mr. Walter") and Berliner, Zisser,
Walter & Gallegos (the "Firm") restate the issues presented for review in
conformance with the issues addressed by the trial court.
Issue #1
Was the trial court correct in ruling that Mr. Worthen's contract claims against
Mr. Walter and the Firm were barred by the four-year statute of limitation governing
oral contract claims considering that the last event necessary to complete Mr.
Worthen's breach of contract claim against Mr. Walter and the Firm occurred on
September 9, 1992, when AST issued Mr. Walter the Replacement Certificate?
Issue Preserved for Appeal: On December 9, 1999, Mr. Worthen filed a
Notice of Appeal (R. 443-44) specifically preserving this issue for review on appeal.
Standard of Review: The application of a statute of limitation presents a
question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Dow v. Gilroy, 910 P.2d 1249,
1250 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); see also United Park CityMines Co. v. Greater Park City
Company, 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993); Gramlich v. Munsey, 838 P.2d 1131,
1132 (Utah 1992).
Issue #2
Was the trial court correct in ruling that Mr. Worthen's breach of contract claim
against Mr. Walter and the Firm failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted given that Mr. Worthen's First Amended Complaint failed to sufficiently
allege and demonstrate that Mr. Walter or the Firm caused him any damage?
Issue Preserved for Appeal: On December 9, 1999, Mr. Worthen filed a
Notice of Appeal (R. 443-44) specifically preserving this issue for review on appeal.
Standard of Review: A 12(b)(6) dismissal presents a question of law, which
is reviewed for correctness, granting no deference to the trial court. Larson v. Park
City Mun Corp , 955 P.2d 343, 345 (Utah 1998); see also St. Benedict's Dev. Co.
v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P 2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). The appellate court
accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true and considers the facts and
all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in a light most favorable to the
losing party below. Id.; see also Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d
1218, 1219 (Utah 1996).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Section 78-12-25 of the Utah Code provides:
An action may be brought within four years:
1) upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an
instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods,
wares, and merchandise, and for any article charged on a store
account, also on an open account for work, labor, or services
rendered, or materials furnished; provided, that action in all of the
foregoing cases may be commenced at any time within four
years after the last charge is made or the last payment is
received;
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (1996)(emphasis added).
Section 78-12-23 of the Utah Code provides:
An action may be brought within six years:
(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument
in writing, except those mentioned in Section 78-12-22.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 (1996)(Emphasis added).
Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether
a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be
asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made
by motion: . . (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can he
granted, .... A motion making any of these defenses shall be made
before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. ... If, on a motion
asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court,
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed
of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by
Rule 56.
U.R.C.P. 12(b)(1999)(emphasis added).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the Order granting Mr Walter and the Firm's Rule 9(b)
& 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Mr. Worthen's First Amended Complaint with prejudice
and denying Mr. Worthen's Motion to Disqualify.
The basis of this dispute stems from Mr. Worthen's purchase of 17,600,000
shares of Fintech, Inc. ("Fintech") stock from a group of controlling shareholders on
March 12, 1986. Mr. Walter was among the group of controlling shareholders who
sold Fintech stock to Mr. Worthen. Mr. Walter, individually, sold Mr. Worthen
3,100,000 shares (7,750 post-split shares) of Fintech's common stock.
Subsequent to the sale of stock to Mr. Wortnen, Fintech changed its name
to Summa Metals Company causing Mr. Walter to be confused about the stock
transfer. As a result of this confusion, in July of 1992, more than six years after the
sale of the stock to Mr. Worthen, Mr. Walter reported a lost certificate because he
believed he owned the stock and because Mr. Worthen had failed to transfer the
Fintech stock into his own name. Consequently, a stop transfer order was placed
on the Certificate.
Mr. Worthen alleged three claims against Mr Walter and the Firm in his First
Amended Complaint: (1) breach of contract; (2) civil conspiracy; and (3) fraud. Mr.
Worthen also unsuccessfully moved the trial court to disqualify Mark A. Larsen ("Mr.
Larsen") as Mr. Walter and the Firm's counsel.
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B. Course of Proceedings
On February 16, 1999, Mr. Worthen pro se filed his Complaint against Mr.
Walter, Seabord Surety Company ("Seabord"), and American Securities Transfer &
Trust, Inc. ("AST"), alleging conspiracy, breach of contract and fraud. Mr. Worthen
failed to personally serve the defendants, and consequently, Mr. Walter, Seabord
and AST each filed Rule 12(b)(5) Motions to Quash Service. On April 22, 1999, the
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson granted each of the Motions to Quash Service of the
Summons and Complaint.
On June 10, 1999, Mr. Walter filed his partial answerand his Rule 9(b) Motion
to Strike the Fraud Claim. On August 2, 1999, Mr. Worthen filed his First Amended
Complaint, which included the Firm as a named defendant. In response, on August
31, 1999, Mr. Walter and the Firm filed a Rule 9(b) & 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Mr.
Worthen's First Amended Complaint. OnSeptember28,1999, Mr. Worthen filed his
memorandum in opposition to Mr. Walter's and the Firm's Motion to Dismiss and his
Motion to Disqualify Attorney of Record. Subsequently, on October 4, 1999, Mr.
Walter and the Firm filed their Reply Memorandum in Further Support of Their
Motion to Dismiss Mr. Worthen's First Amended Complaint, and on October 12,
1999, Mr. Walter and the Firm filed their Memorandum in Opposition to Mr.
Worthen's Motion to Disqualify Attorney of Record, accompanied by supporting
affidavits.
Mark A Larsen ("Mir. Larsen"), counsel for Mr. Walter and the Firm, spoke with
Judge Wilkinson's clerk regarding the feasibility of scheduling a hearing given Mr.
Worthen's incarceration in Lompoc, California. Mr. Larsen agreed to waive his
request for oral argument and agreed to submit Mr. Walter and the Firm's Rule 9(b)
& 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Mir. Worthen's Firs': Amended Complaint to Judge
Wilkinson to enable him to dispcse of all pending motions at one time.
On October 26, 1999, Judge Wilkinson, in a 4-501 Ruling, granted Mr. Walter
and the Firm's Rule 9(b) & 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Mr. Worthen's First Amended
Complaint and denied M'. Worthen's Motion to Disqualify Attorney of Record.
On December 9, 1999, Mr. Worthen simultaneously filed a Notice of Appeal
and a Motion to Reconsider. Mr. Walter and the Firm filed an objection to Mr.
Worthen's Motion to Reconsider, and on February 11, 2000, Mr. Worthen withdrew
his Motion to Reconsider.
C. Disposition of Trial Court
On November 12, 1999, Judge Wilkinson signed the Order dismissing Mr.
Worthen's First Amended Complaint against Mr. Walter and the Firm with prejudice
and denying Mr. Worthen's Motion to Disqualify Attorney of Record. Judge
Wilkinson's decision was based upon his determination that
(1) Mr. Worthen failed to demonstrate how Mr. Walter and the Firm caused
any loss to him;
(2) Mr. Worthen's First Amended Complaint failed to allege any of the
requisite elements of civil conspiracy against Mr. Walter or the Firm;
(3) Mr. Worthen's claims against the firm failed under the intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine;
(4) the applicable four-year statute of limitations governing oral contract
claims barred Mr. Worthen's claims against Mr. Walter and the Firm;
(5) the applicable three-year statute of limitations governing fraud claims
barred Mr. Worthen's claims against Mr. Walter and the Firm:
(6) the applicable three-year statute of limitations governing claims against
stockholders of a corporation bars Mr. Worthen's claims against Mr.
Walter; and
(7) Mr. Worthen's Motion to Disqualify Mr. Larsen was without merit. Mr.
Worthen's appeal stems from this decision.
In his opening brief, Mr. Worthen failed to address or raise any issues
regarding the trial court's ruling on his civil conspiracy and fraud claims, or his
attempt to disqualify Mr. Larsen as Mr. Walter and the Firm's counsel. Consequently,
Mr. Worthen waived these issues on appeal and this appeal is solely limited to his
breach of contract claim against Mr. Walter. Pease v. Industrial Comm'n, 694 P.2d
613, 616 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)(An appellant has "the obligation to raise all the issues
that could have been presented at that time, and those issues not raised [are]
waived.")
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Worthen's Statement of Facts includes the following facts which are not
supported by the record.
In paragraph 1 of Mr. Worthen's Statement of Facts, the pages cited to
in the record do not support Mr. Worthen's contention that his stock
purchase was pursuant to a written purchase agreement.
Similarly, paragraph 2 of Mr. Worthen's Statement of Facts again
includes reference to the same purchase agreement, which is not
supported by any of the pages cited to in the record.
In paragraph 4 of Mr. Worthen's Statement of Facts, the pages cited to
in the record do not support Mr. Worthen's contention that, at the time
Mr. Walter sold the stock at issue to Mr. Worthen, Mr. Walter worked at
the Firm. Quite the contrary is supported by the record. When Mr.
Walter sold Mr. Worthen the stock at issue, Mr. Walter worked at his
own firm known as Robert W. Walter, P.C. (R. 4, 9).
In paragraph 8 of Mr. Worthen's Statement of Facts, the pages cited to
in the record do not support Mr. Worthen's contention that the value of
the stock represented by Certificate 115 equaled $116,250.00. The
citation to the record supports the fact that the stock of Casmyn
Corporation declined from approximately $15 per share in value to a
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bid price of $13.50 per share, and makes no reference to the value of
stock represented by Certificate 115.
As a result, pursuant to Rule 24(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Mr. Walter and the Firm set forth the following material facts:
Mr. Walter resides in Colorado where he is a licensed attorney (R. 159, 225).
Berliner Zisser Walter & Gallegos is the law firm where Mr. Walter is currently
employed (R. 159-60,225).
On March 12,1986, John E. Worthen ("Mr. Worthen") acquired, from a group
of controlling shareholders, 17,600,000 shares of Fintech stock , which included
3,100,000 shares from Mr. Walter (R. 161, 225). When Mr. Walter sold Mr. Worthen
the stock at issue, Mr. Walter worked at his own firm known as Robert W. Walter,
P.C. (R. 4, 9).
American Securities Transfer & Trust, Inc. ("AST") is the appointed transfer
agent for Fintech (R. 161, 225). On December 11, 1985, AST issued stock
certificate no. 115 (the "Certificate") evidencing 3,100,000 shares (7,750 post-split
shares) of Fintech's common stock registered in the name of Mr. Walter (R. 110 fl
4). On January 23,1992, the Certificate was presented to AST for transfer, but was
rejected for Rule 144 paperwork paper work necessary to remove the restrictive
legend on the Certificate (R. 110 fl 5).
Subsequent to the sale of stock to Mr. Worthen, Fintech has from time to time
changed its corporate name. Between November 29, 1991, and September 26,
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1994, Fintech's name was changed to Summa Metals Corporation. From
September 26, 1994, to the present time, Fintech's name has been Casmyn
Corporation (R. 110^3).
Given the various changes in Fintech's corporate name, Mr. Walter was
confused about the stock transfer (R. 226). As a result of this confusion, in July of
1992, more than six years after the sale of the stock to Mr. Worthen, Mr. Walter-
reported a lost certificate because he believed he owned the stock and because Mr
Worthen had failed to transfer the Fintech stock into his own name. As a result, a
stop transfer order was placed on the Certificate (R. 226, 110 |f 6).
On August 12, 1992, Mr. Walter executed and submitted to AST an Affidavit
of Loss in furtherance of obtaining a replacement certificate (R 188-89). On
September 9, 1992, AST issued Mr. Walter a replacement certificate no. 1038 (the
"Replacement Certificate") (R. 111 fl 8).
In the late Fall of 1994, AST received an inquiry from Mr. Worthen's broker
stating that he had possession of the Certificate and wanted to know the status oi;
the Certificate. Thna Leigh advised Mr. Worthen s broker that the Certificate had
been reported lost, that a stop order had been placed on the Certificate and that the
Certificate was not valid since the Replacement Certificate had been issued on
September 9, 1992. (R. 295 ffll 3-4)
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On March 23, 1995, Stephen C. Vickstrom instructed AST to place a stop
payment notation on the Replacement Certificate because there was a dispute over
its ownership. (R. 299)
Throughout September 1996, a series of communications ensued between
David Billeter, Mr. Worthen's former counsel, and Mr. Walter regarding the
ownership of the Certificate (R. 193,195-96). On April 3, 1997, when the error due
to the confusion from the name change was brought to Mr. Walter's attention, and
after he had an opportunity to review the signature guaranty on the Certificate, he
released all claims he had to the Certificate (R. 204, 206).
On or about December 16, 1997, Mr. Walter returned the Replacement
Certificate (R. 297 fl 14, 312-13). As of June 9, 1999, the Certificate remains
registered in Mr. Walter's name. (R. 298 H 17, 316).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
This Court should uphold the decision of the trial court by finding that it was
correct in ruling that the four-year statute of limitations governing oral contracts
barred Mr. Worthen's breach of contract claim against Mr. Walter. Contrary to Mr.
Worthen's suggestion, the last event necessary to complete his breach of contract
claim against Mr. Walter was Mr. Walter's alleged breach, which occurred on
September 9, 1992, when AST issued Mr. Walter the Replacement Certificate.
Despite numerous attempts to circumvent the statute of limitations, including raising
new issues on appeal, each of Mr. Worthen's arguments lacks merit.
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Additionally, this Court should uphold the decision of the trial court by finding
that it was correct in dismissing Mr. Worthen's First Amended Complaint with
prejudice because he failed to make a sufficient showing that Mr. Walter caused any
loss to him, an essential element of his breach of contract claim, with respect tc
which he had the burden of proof.
Finally, after considering the facts and circumstances surrounding this appeal
this Court should not only affirm the trial court's decision dismissing Mr. Worthen's
First Amended Complaint with prejudice, but should also grant Mr. Walter and the
Firm damages against Mr. Worthen pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT MR. WQRTHEN's
BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM AGAINST MR. WALTER WAS
BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE FOUR-YEAR STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS GOVERNING ORAL CONTRACT CLAIMS
The arguments advanced by Mr. Worthen in his opening appellate brief
regarding the trial court's decision that his contract claims against Mr. Walter and the
Firm were barred by the relevant statute of limitations, raised new issues that were
not addressed by the trial court and were raised for the first time on appeal
Specifically, Mr. Worthen raised the following issues for the first time on appeal: (1)
his breach of contract claim did not arise until March 23, 1995; (2) Mr. Walter's letter
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regarding Mr. Worthen's ownership of the Fintech stock tolled the statute of
limitations; (3) the discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations; and (4) Mr. Worthen
purchased the Fintech stock from Mr. Walter pursuant to a written purchase
agreement and, therefore the six-year statute of limitations governing written
contracts applies instead of the four-year limitations period governing oral contracts.
In addition to raising these issues for the first time on appeal, Mr. Worthen's
arguments lack merit.
A. The Last Event Necessary to Complete Mr. Worthen's
Breach of Contract Claim Against Mr. Walter and the Firm
Occurred on September 9, 1992, When AST Issued Mr.
Walter the Replacement Certificate
The trial court correctly ruled that the four-year statute of limitations governing
oral contracts barred Mr. Worthen's breach of contract claim against Mr. Walter and
the Firm. Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1 )(1996), an action based upon an oral
contract may be brought within four years.
As a general rule, a cause of action accrues and the relevant limitations period
begins to run "upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause
of action . . . [and] mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action does not
prevent the running of the statute of limitations." Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84,
86 (Utah 1981).
As applied to the subject dispute, the applicable four-year statute of limitations
governing oral contracts began to run when the last event necessary to complete the
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cause of action occurred. Although a breach of contract claim requires the plaintiff
to allege the existence of a contract, a breach, causation, and damages as a result
of the breach, the last event necessary to complete this cause of action is a breach.
Contrary to Mr. Worthen's suggestion, the last event necessary to complete
his breach of contract claim against Mr. Walter is Mr. Walter's alleged breach, which
occurred on September 9, 1992, when AST issued Mr. Walter the Replacement
Certificate. At that time, Mr. Worthen would have been able to allege the requisite
elements of a breach of contract claim. Mr. Worthen could have alleged that a
contract existed, that Mr. Walter oreached the contract by having the Replacement
Certificate issued, that Mr. Walter's breach caused him damages, and that he
suffered damages in an amount equal to the amount he paid Mr. Walter for the
3,100,000 shares of Fintech stock.
Simply stated, based upon the allegations in the Amended Complaint, Mr.
Worthen entered into a contract with Mr. Walter for the purchase of 3,100,000
shares of Fintech stock. Mr. Walter agreed to sell Mr. Worthen the Fintech shares
he owned, and in exchange, Mr. Worthen agreed to purchase the Fintech stock from
Mr. Walter. Subsequently, on September 9, 1992, when AST issued Mr. Walter the
Replacement Certificate, Mr. Walter breached the contract. Mr. Walter's breach
immediately allegedly resulted in damages to Mr. Worthen given that Mr. Worthen
satisfied his obligation to pay Mr. Walter for the stock and essentially received
nothing of value in return.
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Mr. Worthen waited until February 16, 1999, more than six years after Mr.
Walter's breach, to file the Complaint. Considering that the last event necessary to
complete Mr. Worthen's breach of contract claim occurred on September 9, 1992,
Mr. Worthen had until September 9,1996, to file the Complaint. As a result of failing
to file the Complaint within the statutory period, Mr. Worthen's breach of contract
claim against Mr. Walter was barred by the relevant statute of limitations. In short,
the trial court correctly ruled that Mr. Worthen's breach of contract claim against Mr.
Walter was barred by the four-year statute of limitations governing oral contracts
because Mr. Worthen waited more than six years before he filed the Complaint.
B. Mr. Worthen's ArgumentThat His Breach of Contract Action
Against Mr. Walter Did Not Arise until March 23, 1995 Is
Contrary to the Facts and Undermines the Guiding Policy
Considerations for Enacting Limitation Periods
Mr. Worthen acknowledged that Mr. Walter breached the contract on
September 9, 1992, when AST issued Mr. Walter the Replacement Certificate.
However, Mr. Worthen contends that he was not damaged until March 23, 1995,
when Stephen C. Vickstrom instructed AST to place a stop payment notation on the
Replacement Certificate because there was a dispute over its ownership. Mr.
Worthen suggests that he was not damaged by Mr. Walter's breach prior to this time,
because the breach did not interfere with his attempts to sell the stock. Not only is
this suggestion counterintuitive and contrary to the facts, it circumvents the
underlying policy considerations for enacting limitation periods.
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"Statutes of limitations 'are designed to promote justice by preventing
surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber unti
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared."
Sevyv. Security Title Co. ofS. Utah, 902 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah 1995)(c/f/ng Myers v
McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah J\98J\)(quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944))).
By arguing that the four-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until
March 23,1995, Mr. Worthen is essentially trying to improperly select when the las"
event necessary to complete his breach of contract claim against Mr. Walter
occurred. To allow Mr. Worthen to do this would permit him to circumvent the
statute of limitations by allowing him, in his sole discretion, to dictate exactly when
he suffered damages. If this Court were to agree with Mr. Worthen's argument that
he did not suffer any damages from Mr. Walter's breach until March 23, 1995, then
this Court would create an enormous loophole in the statute of limitations
jurisprudence that would enable plaintiffs to effectively circumvent limitation periods.
Additionally, allowing Mr. Worthen to improperly select when the last event
necessary to complete his breach of contract claim against Mr. Walter occurred
undermines the policy considerations that dictate the necessity for enacting statutes
of limitations. More than 14 years have lapsed since Mr. Worthen purchased the
Fintech stock from Mr. Walter, and it is likely that evidence has been lost, memories
have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.
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In summary, given the policy considerations, combined with the fact that Mr.
Walter's breach occurred on September 9,1992, not March 23,1995, Mr. Worthen's
argument that his Complaint was timely filed because his breach of contract action
did not arise until March 23, 1995 lacks merit.
C. Mr. Walter's Acknowledgment of Mr. Worthen's Ownership
of the Shares Is Not the Type of Acknowledgment
Contemplated by Section 78-12-44 of the Utah Code Relating
to Acknowledgment of a Debt, Liability or Claim
Section 78-12-44 of the Utah Code has no application to Mr. Worthen's breach
of contract claim against Mr. Walter and, therefore, provides no basis for tolling the
relevant statute of limitations. Section 78-12-44 provides:
In any case founded on contract, when any part of the
principal or interest shall have been paid, or an
acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or claim, or
any promise to pay the same, shall have been made, an
action may be brought within the period prescribed for the
same after such payment, acknowledgment or promise;
but such acknowledgment or promise must be in writing,
signed by the party to be charged thereby. When a right
of action is barred by the provisions of any statute, it shall
be unavailable either as a cause of action or ground of
defense.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44 (1953).
This statute clearly has no application to Mr. Worthen's breach of contract
claim against Mr. Walter. Mr. Walter's letter, dated April 3, 1997, provides, in
pertinent part: "[hjaving reviewed the signature guaranty on the reverse of the stock
certificate which was forwarded by Mr. Billeter, it does appear that the signature on
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such signature guaranty is in fact my own. On the basis of the apparent accuracy
of that document, I hereby release any claim to the foregoing certificates." (R. 204)
Mr. Worthen argues that this letter constitutes an acknowledgment By advancing
this argument, Mr. Worthen is torturing the concept of an acknowledgment
necessary to extend the statute of limitations. The acknowledgment contemplated
by the statute is "an acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or claim, or any
promise to pay the same," not a release of an ownership interest. Utah Code Ann.
§78-12-44(1953).
In conclusion, considering that§ 78-12-44 of the Utah Code has no relevant
application to Mr. Worthen's breach of contract claim against Mr. Walter, Mr.
Walter's letter releasing his ownership interest in the Certificate fails to provide a
basis for extending the applicable statute of limitations.
D. The Discovery Rule Does Not Provide a Basis for Tolling the
Applicable Statute of Limitations for a Sufficient Period of
Time to Circumvent the Preclusion of Mr. Worthen's Claim
Against Mir. Walter Because Mr. Worthen Knew, or Should
Have Known, of the Alleged Breach in the Fall of 1994, When
Mr. Worthen's Stock Broker Contacted American Securities
Transfer (' Ast") and Was Advised That Certificate 115 Had
Been Reported Lost, That a Stop Order Had Been Placed on
the Certificate, and That a Replacement Certificate Had Been
Issued on September 9, 1992
The statute of limitations governing Mr. Worthen's claim does not provide a
basis for tolling the applicable limitation period for a sufficient period of time to
circumvent the preclusion of his breach of contract claim against Mr. Walter. The
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discovery rule is considered an exception to the general rule regarding statutes of
limitations, and delays the running of the limitation period "until the discovery of facts
forming the basis for the cause of action."' Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d
1125, 1129 (Utah W§2)(quoting Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d at 86).
In addressing this issue, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that:
an action is time-barred ifthe plaintiff discovered or should
have discovered the alleged wrongdoing within the
limitation period and that the question of when it was or
should have been discovered is a question of fact.
Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873,
877 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984). The
Mosesian court further added that the question may be
decided as a matter of law only when"'uncontroverted
evidence irrefutably demonstrates plaintiff discovered or
should have discovered the fraudulent conduct.'" Id.
{quoting Kramas v. Security Gas & Oil Inc., 672 F.2d 766,
770 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 1035 (1982)).
United Park CityMines Co. v. Greater Park City Company, 870 P.2d 880, 886 (Utah
1993).
The Utah Supreme Court "has recognized three circumstances where the
discovery rule applies: (1) in situations where the discovery rule is mandated by
statute; (2) in situations where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of
action because of the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) in
situations where the case presents exceptional circumstances and the application
of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any showing that the
defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action." Id.
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Because this is an issue raised for the first time on appeal, Mr. Worthen failed
to present to the trial court any argument regarding the application of the discovery
rule to his case. Mr. Worthen suggested that trial court overlooked facts which he
alleged were sufficient to invoke the discovery rule. In making this argument. Mr.
Worthen failed to recognize thai: it was not the obligation of the trial court to invoke
the discovery rule. Rather, it was his responsibility to raise the discovery rule as an
exception to the general rule regarding statutes of limitations. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, All U.S. 317(1986).
Additionally, none of the circumstances articulated by the Utah Supreme Court
apply to allow Mr. Worthen to invoke the discovery rule. First, as applied to the facts
before this Court, this discover/ rule is not mandated by statute. Second. Mr.
Worthen has never asserted that he was not aware of his cause of action because
of the Mr. Walter's concealment or misleading conduct. Finally, this case neither
presents exceptional circumstances, nor would the application of the general rule be
irrational or unjust.
Furthermore, even if Mr. Worthen was allowed to invoke the discovery rule,
the uncontroverted evidence irrefutably demonstrates that Mr. Worthen discovered
or should have discovered Mr. Walter's breach in the Fall of 11994, when Mr.
Worthen's stock broker contacted American Securities Transfer ("AST") and was
advised that Certificate 115 had been reported lost, that a stop order had been
placed on the Certificate, and that the Replacement Certificate had been issued on
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September9,1992. See United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Company,
870 P.2d 880 (Utah 1993).
Considering that Mr. Worthen discovered the facts forming the basis for his
breach of contract claim against Mr. Walter in the Fall of 1994, he had until the Fall
of 1998 to file the Complaint. Mr. Worthen filed the Complaint on February 16,1999,
which was after the limitation period expired. Consequently, even if the discovery
rule were applied to toll Mr. Worthen's breach of contract claim against Mr. Walter
until he discovered the facts forming the basis of his claim, he still failed to file the
Complaint within the applicable time period.
In summary, because the discovery rule presents an issue for the first time on
appeal, the trial court was never given the opportunity to address its application to
Mr. Worthen's breach of contract claim against Mr. Walter. Additionally, none of the
circumstances articulated by the Utah Supreme Court apply to allow Mr. Worthen to
invoke the discovery rule. Furthermore, even if the discovery rule were applied to
toll Mr. Worthen's breach of contract claim against Mr. Walter until he discovered the
facts forming the basis of his claim, he still failed to file the Complaint within the
applicable time period.
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E. Mr. Worthen's Argument That He Purchased the Fintech
Shares Through a Written Purchase Agreement Is Not
Supported by the Record, and Even If the Purchase Was
Pursuant to a Written Agreement, the Six-year Statute of
Limitations Governing Written Contracts Would Bar Mr.
Worthen's Breach of Contract Claims Against Mr. Walter
Mr. Worthen's argument that he purchased the Fintech stock from Mr. Walter
pursuant to a written purchase agreement is not supported by the record and Mr.
Worthen neither alleged nor provided incorporated documentation evidencing a
written purchase agreement in either the Complaint orthe First Amended Complaint.
The pages Mr. Worthen cited to in the record do not support his contention that this
stock purchase was pursuant to a written purchase agreement.
Mr. Worthen mentioned a written agreement once, when he stated: "Mr.
Walter entered into a written agreement signed by all ofthoseof his group who sold
shares to Worthen and disclosure of that agreement was made public pursuant to
Securities and Exchange Commission regulations, and such disclosure did not refer
to conditional sale." (R. 334). This is the only time Mr. Worthen mentioned a written
agreement in any of the pleadings or motions filed with the trial court, and this
statement regarding the written agreement is ambiguous. One plausible
interpretation is that the written agreement referred to was between Mr. Walter and
the other controlling shareholders who sold Mr. Worthen stock.
Moreover, even if the contract was in writing, it would be barred by the six-
year statute of limitations contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23(2). Under Utah
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Code Ann. § 78-12-23(2)(1996), an action based upon a written contract may be
brought within six years.
As previously discussed, Mr. Walter's breach of contract occurred on
September 9, 1992, when AST issued Mr. Walter the Replacement Certificate.
Pursuant to the six-year statute of limitations governing written contracts, Mr.
Worthen had until September 9, 1998, to file the Complaint. Mr. Worthen filed the
Complaint on February 16, 1999, which was after the limitation period expired.
In short. Mr. Worthen's assertion that he purchased the Fintech shares from
Mr. Walter pursuant to a written purchase agreement is not factually supported by
the record. Even if the contract was in writing, it would be barred by the six-year
statute of limitations governing written contracts given that Mr. Walter breached the
contract on September 9, 1992, when AST issued Mr. Walter the Replacement
Certificate.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT MR. WORTHEN's
BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM AGAINST MR. WALTER FAILED
TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED
BECAUSE MR. WORTHEN FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT MR.
WALTER CAUSED HIM ANY LOSS
Mr, Worthen's First Amended Complaint failed to assert a claim against Mr.
Walter upon which relief could be granted. Mr. Worthen's appeal is limited to his
breach of contract claim against Mr. Walter. A breach of contract claim requires a
showing of causation and damages. The trial court properly dismissed Mr.
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Worthen's First Amended Complaintwith prejudice because he failed to demonstrate
how Mr. Walter caused any loss to him.
Mr. Worthen failed to allege in his First Amended Complaint that if he
had possession of the stock in question he would have sold it; and
Mr. Worthen owned 14,500,000 additional shares in Fintech stock
available to him for sale. He failed to allege in his First Amendec
Complaint that he sold any of this Fintech stock during this time anc
also failed to allege that after selling all of the other Fintech stock
available to him, he was unable to sell the Fintech stock Mr. Walter sole
to him.
In other words, before Mr. Walter's conduct could cause Mr. Worthen any
damage, he would have to sell all of his available stock. If he did not do so, not only
is there no loss causation, but he also obviously failed to mitigate his damages.
Loss causation has been addressed in other cases. In Virginia Bank Shares
Inc. v. Sanberg, 501 U.S. 1C83 (1991), Virginia Bank had 2,000 minority
shareholders holding a total of 15% of the common stock. The Board obtained an
opinion from an investment banking firm that $42.00 per share represented a far
price. The Executive Committee and the entire Board of Directors approved the
"freeze-out" merger based upon the investment banking firm's opinionon price. The
violation was based upon alleged false statements in a proxy solicitation. The
alleged misrepresentation attempting to garner the minority shareholder's vote was
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unnecessary and meaningless, i.e., the merger would have taken place even if all
of the minority shareholders voted against it.
The thrust behind the holding in Virginia Bank Shares is that a shareholder
cannot plead loss causation in the situation where his vote as a shareholder is
essentially meaningless. It is based upon a claimed false representation contained
in a proxy statement requesting minority shareholders' votes in favor of a squeeze-
out merger. This false statement is based upon the Board of Directors' action. In
other words, the focus of the case is upon whether a false statement soliciting a
shareholder vote which was unnecessary to effectuate the merger pleads loss
causation. In the Virginia Bank Shares case, the conclusion reached was that any
false statements to minority shareholders were meaningless because their vote was
unnecessary to effect the squeeze-out merger. The minority shareholders could not
alter the outcome of the merger regardless of how they voted, so lying to them to
persuade them to vote in favor of the merger when their vote did not matter could not
damage them.
Similarly, in this case, any delay associated with providing Mr. Worthen
access to the shares Mr. Walter sold him in Fintech could not cause any loss to Mr.
Worthen when Mr. Worthen owned 14,500,000 additional shares in Fintech stock
available to him for sale if he wanted sell them. To plead and establish loss
causation in this case, Mr. Worthen must plead that he first sold the additional
14,500,000 shares in Fintech stock he owned. Mr. Walter's actions in clouding the
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title to the Fintech stock he sold Mr. Worthen, as in the Virginia Bank case, simply
do not matter when Mr. Worthen owned an additional 14,500,000 shares of Fintech
stock he decided not to sell: There is no loss causation.
Considering that Mr. Worthen has not demonstrated that Mr. Walter caused
him any damage, the trial court correctly dismissed his breach of contract clain
against Mr. Walter.,
Given the arguments Mr. Worthen advanced in his opening brief, it is readily
apparent that he failed to understand the basis of the trial court's ruling on the
12(b)(6) issue. The trial court determined that Mr. Worthen's breach of contract
claim against Mr. Walter failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted
because Mr. Worthen failed to allege or demonstrate how Mr. Walter caused any
loss to him. The trial court's decision did not hinge on whether Mr. Worthen alleged
damages, rather, the trial court ruled that Mr. Worthen failed to allege a claim upon
which relief could be granted because he failed to plead causation which is a critical
element to his breach of contract claim.
Mr. Worthen's arguments that he stated a claim upon which relief could be
granted focuses solely on the damage element. Mr. Worthen argues that he is
entitled to lost profit, compensatory, restitution, and nominal damages, and he even
goes so far as to allege that he might be able to recover punitive damages even
though restitution, nominal and punitive damages were never requested in his First
Amended Complaint.
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POINT III
MR. WORTHEN NEVER FILED A WRITTEN REQUEST FOR A
HEARING PURSUANT TO RULE 4-501(3)(B) AND,
CONSEQUENTLY, WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO A HEARING
Mr. Worthen failed to request a hearing and consequently waived his right to
a hearing. Rule 4-501 (3)(F) provides: "If no written request for a hearing is made at
the time the parties file their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be
deemed waived." Utah Code of Jud. Admin. 4-501 (3)(F). As a result of failing to
request a hearing, Mr. Worthen was not prejudiced by the trial court's decision in the
absence of a hearing.
If Mr. Worthen wanted a hearing, Mr. Worthen easily could have requested
one. Rule 4-501 (3)(B) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration provides:
In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of
the action or any claim in the action on the merits with
prejudice, either party at the time of filing the principal
memorandum in support of or in opposition to a motion
may file a written request for a hearing.
Utah Code Jud. Admin. 4-501(3)(B).
Although Mr. Walter requested a hearing, Mr. Walter waived his request given
the logistical problems due to Mr. Worthen's incarceration in Lompoc, California at
the time. Nothing in the Utah Codeof Judicial Administration precludes a party from
subsequently waiving their request for an oral argument. Further, Mr. Worthen fails
to suggest how he would have attended oral argument in Utah, given his
incarceration at Lompoc.
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In addition, Mr. Worthen argues that the court never should have decided Mr.
Walter and the Firm's Rule 9(b) & 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Mr Worthen's First
Amended Complaint because a notice to submit for decision was not filed.
Admittedly, a written notice to submit for decision was not filed with the court. Mr.
Larsen, however, orally requested Judge Wilkinson's clerk to submit Mr. Walter and
the Firm's Motion to Dismiss to Judge Wilkinson for decision. Judge Wilkinson's
clerk contacted Mr. Larsen to discuss waiving the request for an oral argument given
the logistical problems of conducting a hearing as a result of Mr. Worthen's
incarceration in Lompoc, California. Mr. Larsen waived Mr. Walter and the Firm's
request for a hearing and requested the Clerk to submit their Rule 9(b) & 12(b)(6)
Motion to Dismiss Mr. Worthen's First Amended Complaint to Judge Wilkinson for
decision to enable him to decide all pending motions at one time.
Even if it was error for the trial court to render a decision absent a writter
notice to submit for decision anc without a hearing, the result would not have beer
different in the absence of the error. In Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter Day Saints
Hosp., 318 P.2d 330 (Utah 1957) the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[w]e are
aware of an in accord with the mandate not to reverse a case merely because of
error, and we will do so only when it appears to be prejudicial to the rights of a
party." Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter Day Saints Hosp., 318 P.2d at 333 {citations
omitted). In other words, if the error appears to be of such nature that it was of no
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material consequence in its effect because the trial court would have arrived at the
same result, regardless of such error, the error is harmless.
Clearly if any error occurred, it was harmless. Given that Mr. Worthen failed
to request a hearing, Mr. Worthen was not prejudiced by the trial court's decision in
the absence of a hearing. Additionally, Mr. Worthen was not prejudiced by the
absence of a written notice to submit for decision. The trial court's ruling dismissing
Mr. Worthen's First Amended Complaintwith prejudice would have been exactly the
same regardless of whether or not Mr. Walter and the Firm filed a written notice to
submit for decision.
Mr. Worthen also argues that up until October 26, 1999, when the trial court
issued its 4-501 ruling, that he could have provided further support for his position
at oral argument. Neither the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, nor the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration would allow Mr. Worthen to submit new evidence in further
support of his position at oral argument.
As a result of failing to request a hearing, Mr. Worthen waived his right to a
hearing. Consequently, Mr. Worthen was not prejudiced by the fact that Mr. Walter
and the Firms Motion to Dismiss was decided without a hearing.
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POINT IV
MR. WORTHEN'S APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS AND, THEREFORE,
PURSUANT TO RULE 33 OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE MR. WALTER AND THE FIRM SHOULD BE
AWARDED THEIR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL
Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, if this Court
determines that Mr. Worthen's appeal is either frivolous or for delay, it may award
just damages that may include single or double costs and/or reasonable attorney
fees to the prevailing party. U.R.A.P. 33(a) (1999).
A frivolous appeal is defined as "one that is not grounded in fact, nol
warranted by the existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend,
modify, or reverse existing law." U.R.A.P. 33(b)(1999). "An appeal, motion, brief
or other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper
purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain
time that will benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief or other paper."
U.R.A.P. 33(b)(1999).
The standard for frivolous appeal does not require a fmoing of bad faith.
O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). A frivolous appeal is one that
has no reasonable legal or factual basis. Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall.
751 P.2d 1157 (Utah Ct, App. 1988); Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989). A frivolous appeal has also been defined as "[o]ne in which no
justiciable question has been presented and ... is readily recogrizable as devoid
32
of merit in that there is little prospect that it can ever succeed." Hunt v. Hurst, 785
P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990); see also Farrell v. Porter, 830 P.2d 299, 302 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992).
Mr. Worthen's appeal is frivolous. It is frivolous in that the arguments raised
by Mr. Worthen are not grounded in fact nor warranted by existing law, as evidenced
by the numerous issues raised for the first time on appeal combined with the several
facts that are not supported by the record. Additionally, Mr. Worthen's appeal lacks
merit. Regardless of the various avenues Mr. Worthen attempted to use to approach
his greatest hurdle, the statute of limitations, each attempt failed to present a
meritorious argument. Furthermore, Mr. Worthen failed to even address the basis
of the trial court's Rule 12(b)(6) ruling, perhaps out of a lack of understanding of the
essential element of causation to a breach of contract claim.
As a result, this Court should find that Mr. Worthen's appeal is frivolous and
not warranted by existing law, and should award Mr. Walter and the Firm double its
costs and reasonable compensation for the time and labor expended by their
attorneys in defending this appeal.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Walter and the Firm request this Court to affirm the trial court's decision
and find that the trial court correctly dismissed Mr. Worthen's First Amended
Complaint with prejudice. Mr. Walter and the Firm also request that they be
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awarded their costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
Dated: August 30, 2000.
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